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NOTES

COMMON LAW MALICIOUS MISCHIEF IN PENNSYLVANIA 1
A. INTRODUCTORY:
From the earliest days of the Commonwealth the courts of Pennsylvania,
as those of other states and of England, have recognized the existence of a certain
classification of minor common law misdemeanor which they have earmarked
malicious mischief. But from the time of Blackstone to the present day the
courts, and commentators on their decisions, have experienced singular difficulty
in defining the elements of the crime.
Blackstone for example, defines malicious mischief as a "specie of injury
to private property which the law considers a public crime. This is such as is done,
not animo furandi, or with intent of gaining by another's loss, which is some,
though a weak, excuse, but either out of a spirit of wanton cruelty or black and
2
diabolical revenge."
But Corpus Juris and other modern authorities define the crime as much
more extensive. "Malicious Mischief includes all malicious physical injuries to
the rights of another which impair utility or materially diminish value . . . The
offense has been narrowly defined as the wilful destruction of some article
of personal property from actual ill will or resentment toward its owner or
possessor . . . It must be accompanied by a breach of the peace. While it is
sometimes said that the act must amount to a violation of duties owing to the
public and hence must evidence a degree of moral turpitude dangerous to society,
the injury may be either to the rights of another or to those of the public in general. It may consist of the injury to, or disfigurment of, the person of an individual." 8
And impressed, no doubt, with the futility of itself attempting further
definition, American Jurisprudencesimply catalogues the efforts of earlier authorities: "Malicious Mischief has been variously defined as the wilful and unlawful
injury to or destruction of the property of another with the malicious intent to
injure the owner; as any malicious physical injury to the rights of another, which
impairs utility or materially diminishes value; and as any malicious or mischievous
4
physical injury, either to the rights of another or to those of the public in general."

1 In Comm. v. Cunningham, 1 Dist. 573 (1892), and Comm. v. Cramer, 2 Pears. 441 (1884), it
was said that the Pennsylvania courts have gone further than those of England or other states
in holding acts of mischief indictable independently of statute. However, the more common
types of mischief are now indictable under special statutes, so that today an indictment charging
common law malicious mischief is the exception rather than the rule. For this reason, the best
discussions of the subject are found in the older authorities, notably in 1 Tluc:srir, PENNsyLvaxA
CRMAL LAW 188 (1908)

and 4 PEPPER AND Lawis (1899)

2 4 BL. COMM. 243.
8 38 CoRPus Juais 357, § 1.

4 34 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 688, J 2.

§ 5618.
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Apparently, then, while classic and modern authorities are agreed as to the
distinctness of the crime of malicious mischief, they differ radically in stating
the elements of the offense. There is comparitive unanimity in defining the mental
element of malicious mischief as an intent "motivated through a spirit of
wanton cruelty or black and diabolical revenge," or, in terms not quite so Johnsonian, an intent which is "malicious." But legal conceptions as to the objects which
may be the targets of such criminal intentions are worlds apart. Is malicious
mischief a crime affecting only personal property? Or, as Corpus Juris implies,
may it involve an injury to the person, his realty as well as his chattels, or the
property of the public in general? Too many courts have too long labored under
misapprehensions as to the nature of malicious mischief to make possible at this
time any flat statement which might be complimented as an accurate reflection
of the ruling case law in every common law jurisdiction. The writer of this
Note seeks no more than a pragmatic definition of common law malicious
mischief as its elements have been outlined in Pennsylvania cases. That task
alone, as will appear shortly, is formidable enough.
B. THE PHYSICAL ELEMENT:
1. As to the Type of Interest Invaded.
Two points upon which the modern authorities cited supra agree are that
malicious mischief involves a physical injury and that the injury must be inflicted
upon another's person, or upon his property, or upon the rights of the public
in general. To the extent that these definitions include injuries to another's
person as distinguished from his property, and to the extent that they include
injury to the rights of the public, they are broader than the definition of Blackstone. However, the Pennsylvania cases accord with the modern rather than classic
authorities, and, as will be noted infra, in at least one respect they have denominated offenses malicious mischief which would seem beyond the broadest definitions
of the modern encyclopedists.
Pennsylvania agrees that there can be no malicious mischief in the destruction
of one's own property. 5 At least where the destruction is to inanimate property,
the indictment must lay possession in another. 6 And most Pennsylvania cases
involve the orthodox physical injuries to the person or property of another or to
the property of the general public. Cited in Pennsylvania cases as indictable physical
injuries to another's person are cutting the hair of a feeble-minded man in such
a way as to disfigure him, 7 or putting cowitch on a towel so as to infect the
person using it,8 or discharging a gun for the purpose and with the result of dis6 Davis v. Comm., 30 Pa. 421 (1858). However, as will be noted irfra, the court may well be
construed as referring only to inanimate property, for at a later point in its opinion it stated,
by way of dictam, that a wilful and unnecessary injury to animals might be indictable without
legard to ownership.
6 Ibid.
'7 Comm. v. Nusky, I Pa. Dist. 561 (1892).
S Comm. v. Cramer, 2 Pears. 441 (1884).
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turbing a sick person, 9 or casting a carcass into a well used for drinking by another,' 0
or entering a house at night and making such disturbance as to produce the miscarriage, two weeks later," of the owner's wife. Malicious mischiefs physically
inflicted to the realty of another have included cutting his timber, 1" tearing down
his party wall, 8 tearing up his water pipes, 14 breaking his plate glass window, 6
destroying the gates and bars in his fences, 16 upending his telephone poles and
the lines attached,"7 and taking his stoves and window shades and closing his doors
and windows to prevent religious meetings in his house.' 8 In Comm. v. Eckert'9
the physical mischief punished was to the land of the general public, namely the
cutting and deadening of a walnut tree in the public square. But probably the
commonest type of malicious mischief involves a physical injury or destruction to
another's chattels, be they animate-horses, 20 steers, 21 dogs,2 2 or chickens 2 8or inanimate---carriage and sleigh, 2' sweater and cap, 25 saw logs,2 6 boats,21 patterns
for clothing, 28 or tires on a heavily loaded truck. 29 And even this list can not be
regarded as exclusive for, as Dr. Trickett has noted, the courts make liberal
use of induction to justify including some new act within the category of malicious
mischief "by enumerating acts previously held to be such and vaguely asserting
a sufficient similarity between them and the act before the court, without indicating a common quality supposed to be discoverable in them."3 0
But the important distinction now to be drawn in comparing Pennsylvania's
cases with the standard definitions is that not all of them involve the supposed
9 Ibid.
10

Ibid.

11

Comm. v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277 (1812).
12 Comm. v. Wagner, 21 D. & C. 187 (1934). But here prosecution was unsuccessful, since
the defendant acted under claim of right.
18 Comm. v. Strode, 27 W. N. C. 437 (1890).
14 Comm. v. Burton, 5 Kulp 329 (1878).
15 Comm. v. Gordy, 44 Dauphin 335 (1938).
16 Comm. v. Taylor 65 Pa. Super. 113 (1916).
17 Comm. v. Appel., 28 Luz. L. R. 79 (1933).
18 Davis v. Comm., 30 Pa. 421 (1858).
19 2 Bro. 249 (1813).
20 Respublica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 335 (1795); Comm. v. Cramer. 2 Pears. 441 (1884); Comm.
v. Getz. 18 Pa. Dist. 460 (1908).
21 Comm. v. Cramer, cited supra at notes (8) and (20).
22 Cited from LEwzs' CaiMINAL LAW in Comm. v. Cramer, spra.
28 Respublica v. Teischer, I Dal]. 335 (1795); Comm. v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277 (1812); Comm. v.
Eckert, 2 Bro. 249 (1813).
24 Comm. v. Cunningham, I Pa. Dist. 573 (1892).
25 Comm. v. St. Clair, 29 Pa. Dist. 49 (1919).
26 Comm. v. Towle, 1 Lanc. Bar. No. 29 (1884).
27 Comm. v. Byrant, 3 Kulp 290 (1884).
28 Comm. v. Lipshutz, 13 Pa. Dist. 682 (1904).
29 Comm. v. Rothenberger, 32 D. & C. 682 (1938). The indictment alleged that the defendant
"'with force and arms did wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully let air out of the tires of a truck.'
"Letting air out of commercial trucks containing heavy loads cannot be regarded as a trivial
matter, the court opined. "'It was a direct physical blow at the integrity of the tubes, by depriving
them of supporting air, therefore importing a criminal element not merely a prespass." But were
the tires those of an ordinary automobile, the court indicated, one might reach a different Conclusion.
20 1 TFuCK.iT , PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMrNAL LAw

193 (1908).
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prerequisite of "physical injury." For example, in Penn. v. Gillespie3' and Comm.
V. Johnson," the mischief consisted in tearing down advertising of a commissioner's and constable's sale, respectively, and the injury involved was not a physical
one but rather an intangible attack upon the right of the public to collect its taxes
or of an individual creditor to enforce his judgment claims. These cases, therefore,
have led at least one Pennsylvania authority to eliminate from thL definition of
malicious mischief any element of physical injury; Pepper and Lewis defines malicious mischief as ". . . any act injurious to a private person in his property,
right, or person, or to the property or rights of the general public." 33
2. Nature of the Act as it Affects Society.
In the Corpus Juris section quoted, the encyclopedist further notes that, in
order for an injury to be considered malicious mischief, "It is sometimes said that
the act must amount to a violation of duties owing to the public, and hence must
evidence a degree of moral turpitude dangerous to society . . .',34 While not all
Pennsylvania cases have applied this limitation strictly, 35 others used it properly
when occasion arose. The test on this issue has been said to be "the tendency
of the act to produce passion and revenge and a disturbance of the peace of
those who are affected by it."3 6 And if this tendency is not present, these courts
have refused to indict no matter how malicious the act nor how apparent its
injurious effect. Thus, in Comm. v. Edwards,17 the court released on habeas
corpus a defendant indicted for habitually approaching another's house and
grossly abusing his family; the tendency of these acts, the court declared, was
merely to tender the other's life uncomfortable, and since it did not arouse terror
in his family or evidence a degree of moral turpitude dangerous to society, it was
not indictable as a crime. For similar reasons, it was held in Comm. v. Gangloff 38
that an indictment charging the defendant with throwing large stones against another's dwelling house was insufficient in law, in that it did not allege in addition
that the public peace was disturbed or the terror of the prosecutor aroused by these
acts. In still another case and for similar reasons, 39 a court refused to convict of
malicious mischief a defendant who had broken a car door and damaged it to the
extent of $30.
Whatever one might think of the propriety of some of the courts' conclusions
as to the facts then before them, certainly he can have no r'eason to quarrel with
31 Add. 267 (1"795).
82 13 Pa. C. C. 543 (1893). It was not expressly decided here that such an act is indictable at
common law, but there were indications that it is.
88 4 PEPPER ANDlD
LEws § 5618 (1899).
34 38 Coipus JuRis 37, § 1.
85 For example, in Comm. v. St. Clair, 29 Pa. Dist. 49 (1919), it was held to be malicious mischief to take and damage or destroy the sweater and cap of another; but it seems questionable
whether such a trivial trespass ought to be made criminal.
36 1 TRICKdTT, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL LAw 194 (1908).

87 1 Ash. 46 (1823).
88 4 Kulp. 536 (1888).
89 Comm. v. Zaleski 6 D. & C. 500 (1924).
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the principle applied. Malicious mischief is but one of a group of crimes punishing
acts "which have a direct tendency to shock the public sense of morality and
decency"' 0 and are therefore indictable at common law. If the act has no such
tendency, then it is a mere civil trespass, and the public has no interest in prosecuting the defendant. On the other hand, if the act does possess a tendency to
create public disorders, it is apparent that, contrary to the role quoted supra from
Corpus Juris, it is indictable in Pennsylvania though committed in secrecy and
involving no immediate breach of peace."1
3. The Element of Secrecy; Night-time.

In their generally admirable commentary to the Pennsylvania cases written
about the turn of the century, Senator Pepper and Dean Lewis set forth as a
requisite for prosecution as malicious mischief an act's having been "committed
secretly and maliciously, surrepticiously or in the night time, ' ' 42 Their opinion
in this respect was based upon language to rhis effect found in many of the
then ruling Pennsylvania cases. In Comm. v. Gangloff" and Comm. v. Casper-

jon," for example, the fact that the indictments there under consideration did
not charge the defendants with acting in the night or secretly was given as one
reason for their being quashed. In Comm. v. Burton" a conviction was conditioned
on the jury's finding the act to have been done secretly or in the night, and the
same factor was emphasized in upholding convictions in other decisions." However, the great majority of cases made no mention of such a requirement, there
was no reason for making it determinative, certainly Blackstone never heard of
it, and in Comm. v. Lipshutz,47 decided subsequent to all the cases cited, the court
expressly repudiated such dicta, saying it was immaterial whether the defendant's
act in the case, viz. malicious destruction of patterns of clothing, was done by
day or night, secretly or in the presence of others. This last case, therefore, was
cited in 1908 by Dr. Trickett as representing the true state of the law. 4 s The

requirement of secrecy has not been heard of since.
4. The Physical Element finally Defined.
The physical element of common law malicious mischief as it is defined
by the Pennsylvania cases consists of any act which is, or is calculated to create,
a breach of the peace and which directly or indirectly injures the person or property
rights of another or the property rights of the public in general.
40 Note, "Common Law Crimes-When Punishable," 6 UNIv. OF PGH. L. RiV. (1940).
41 E.g., as were the offenses in Comm. v. Towle, Comm. v. Bryant, and Comm, v. Lipshutz-all

noted spra.

4 PsPPzR AND Lawis § 5618 (1899).
43 4 Kulp 536 (1888).
44 14 W. N. C. 106 (1883).
45 5 Kulp 329 (1878).
42

48 Comm. v.Strode, 27 W. N.C.437 (1890); Comm.v.Towle, ILanc. Bar. No. 29 (1884).
47 13 Pa. Dist. 682 (1904).
48 1 Tiuxi-rr, PBNNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL LAw 193 (1908).
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C. THE MENTAL ELEMENT
1. In general.
Blackstone, it will be remembered, heavily weighted his definition of malicious mischief with statements as to its mental element, concluding, finally, that that
consisted of a "spirit of wanton cruelty or black and diabolical revenge." Pennsylvania judges have since wasted much breath in vain endeavors to improve upon
this statement. They have declared, for example, that, "Malice forms the basis
of guilt and evil design proceeds from a depraved and wicked heart." 49 Or, that
there must be "a wilful and malicious purpose ...as evidences a deliberate desire
to do harm and injury, an absolutely wanton and reckless disregard of others." 50
However, for purposes of indictment at least, a district attorney may satisfy procedural requirements by such general, and comparitively innocuous accusations
as, that the defendant acted, "with force and arms, unlawfully, wilfully, wantonly
and with malice."5' 1
Furthermore. despite the absolute moral depravity seemingly required by
Blackstone and his imitators, in actual practice, Pennsylvania courts have been
very liberal in construing various other motives besides malice to be malice
enough. Dr. Trickett has so admirably summarized the holdings on this matter
that not to quote him here, in part at least, would be to do the reader a distinct
disservice.
Vol. I,pp. 195, 196:
"The mental state of the doer is described by Blackstone as a 'spirit of
wanton cruelty or black and diabolical revenge.' The motive may be
injury
dislike of some individual, envy, revenge,52 inducing an act of
to his person or to his property, a deliberate desire to do harm.5 3 It may
be resentment, not towards a person, but towards an animal, e.g., a steer
which has repeatedly trespassed on the defendant's corn-field, but
toward whose owner he feels no malevolence. 5 4 Itmight not be any
form of malevolence, any wish to produce injury, but an indifference to,
or obliviousness of the injury which will incidentally result from the act,
the motive for the act being saving one's own property or sparing one's
self humiliation.5 5 The motive for cutting saw logs loose might be the

desire to injure the owner, or the desire to steal them, or the desire
to see them afloat and to have the pleasure of capture. There, however,
must be malice. If B, thinking a boat worthless and without an owner,
saws it up, his act is not malicious mischief.""
49 Comm. v. Eckert, 2 Bro. 249 (1813).
s0 Comm. v. Lipshutz, 13 Pa. Dist. 682 (1904).
51 Davis v. Comm., 30 Pa. 424 (1858).
52 Comm. v. Cunningham, 1 Pa. Dist. 573 (1892); Comm. v. Bryant, 3 Kulp 290 (1884).
58 Comm. v. Lipshutz, 13 Pa. Dist. 682 (1904).
54 Comm. v. Cramer, 2 Pears. 441 (1884).
55 See on this point Penna. v. Gillespie, Add. 267 (1795), where defendant tore down the notice
of sale of his property.
sI Comm. v. Bryant, 3 Kulp 290 (1884).
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To this last example might be appended others where a defendant was
excused as acting within his rights, or under a bona fide mistake with respect
thereto. Thus, in Comm. v. Drass,97 though actual illwill and deliberate destruction were present, the court refused to convict a defendant of malicious mischief
in tearing down, in a noisy manner accompanied by threats of repeat performance
should similar occasion arise in the future, a fence which a neighbor had innocently
erected on his property. And in Comm. v. Wagner,58 it was held that defendant
was guilty of no more than a civil trespass in entering upon the land of another
and felling his standing timber, when he acted in the reasonable belief that the
land was his own.
A few cases, it would seem, have taken particulary extreme positions in
their constructive findings of malice. Particularly does the decision in Comm. v.
Strode69 impress the writer as such a finding. There a defendant was convicted
of malicious mischief in tearing down a party wall of his neighbor before its
formal condemnation, even though, as defendant knew and the prosecution admitted, the wall was certain to have been condemned had actual appraisement
been made. While it is difficult to construe defendant's actions as motivated by
"wanton cruelty or black and diabolical revenge," nevertheless
the court found
an equivalent thereto in his "wanton disregard of the property and legal rights of
the prosecutor."
But by far the most interesting statement on the subject of malice is the
dictum of Justice Woodward in Davis et al. v. The Commonwealth,60 where
the court gave vent to particularly pungent expressions on the subject of malicious
mischiefs to animals. This particular type of act, the Justice concluded, was
"indicative of a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief and
may therefore be punished by indictment without regard to ownership." If these
statements be taken literally (and Dr. Trickett, for one, apparently thought they
should be)," it would seem possible to indict for malicious mischief a defendant
who unnecessarily inflicts pain upon his own beast. If this be so, of course, it
represents an exception to the general common law rule that a defendant can
commit no crime upon his own property. On the other hand, the exception would
appear justified, if for no other reason than that the sight of an individual
inflicting unnecessary punishment on any animal is apt to induce the objection
of outraged bystanders, with the resultant criminal breach of the peace. But there
have been no express holdings since on this matter, and whether the statements
of Justice Woodward will ever be followed in the future remains problematical.

57 146 Pa. 55 (1891).

58 21 D. & C. 187 (1934).
59 27 W. N. C. 437 (1890).
60 30 Pa. 424 (1858).

61 1 Tamcxrrr, PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMINAL LAW 196 (1908).
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2. The Mental Element Finally Defined.
The mental element of common law malicious mischief as it is defined by the
Pennsylvania cases consists of an intention to knowingly injure, directly or
indirectly, the personal or property rights of another or the property rights of the
public in general, or a wanton disregard of such rights, when the cause, if any,
provoking such injury is legally insufficient to justify its infliction.
D. CONCLUSION.
Summing up, then, all the Pennsylvania cases dealing with malicious mischief,
and joining the definitions of the physical and mental elements derived from the
study thereof, one arrives at the following definition of common law malicious
mischief as it has been applied by the courts of this Commonwealth.
COMMON LAW MALICIOUS MISCHIEF CONSISTS OF ANY ACT
WHICH IS, OR IS CALCULATED TO CREATE, A BREACH OF THE
PEACE, WHICH IS DELIBERATELY AND KNOWINGLY CALCULATED
TO INJURE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, THE PERSON' OR PROPERTY RIGHTS OF ANOTHER OR THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE
PUBLIC IN GENERAL, OR WHICH IS DONE WITH WANTON DISREGARD OF SUCH RIGHTS, WHEN THE CAUSE, IF ANY, PROVOKING
SUCH ACT IS LEGALLY INADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY ITS COMMISSION.
Pat McGrath Jr.

